Court: Supreme Court of India
Case Citation: (2023) 14 Supreme Court Cases 582; 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1733
Bench: Hon’ble Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Hon’ble Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia
Date of Judgment: December 16, 2022
Counsel for the Appellant: Advocates Mr. Divyakant Lahoti and Ms. Madhur Jhavar of Lahoti Advocates

Background:

The case arose from a conviction under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for cruelty against a woman, culminating in her death under suspicious circumstances. The appellant, Rajaram, was the deceased woman’s husband. The case primarily revolved around the weight and credibility of two dying declarations made by the deceased before her death, which were critical to the prosecution’s case.

On April 23, 2009, the deceased, Pushpa, sustained severe burn injuries and succumbed to them on May 10, 2009. Two dying declarations were recorded during her hospitalization, one by a Naib Tehsildar and the other by a police officer. While the first dying declaration (Ext. P-11) mentioned the events leading to the burns, it did not implicate the appellant. However, the second dying declaration (Ext. P-26) specifically accused the appellant and others of subjecting her to cruelty and harassment.

The trial court convicted the appellant under Section 498-A IPC, and this decision was affirmed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The appellant approached the Supreme Court, contesting the validity of the second dying declaration and arguing that the evidence on record did not support his conviction.

Contentions of the Appellant:

The appellant, through his counsel, argued that:

1. Credibility of Dying Declarations: The two dying declarations (Ext. P-11 and Ext. P-26) were inconsistent. While the first declaration did not implicate the appellant, the second one, recorded later, accused him of cruelty. It was contended that the second declaration was unreliable as it lacked medical certification regarding the deceased’s mental and physical fitness at the time of recording.

2. Hostile Witnesses: Key prosecution witnesses, including the deceased’s father, brother, and sister, did not support the allegations of cruelty or dowry harassment, weakening the prosecution’s case.

3. Unsubstantiated Allegations: The appellant contended that there was no independent corroboration of the allegations of cruelty mentioned in the second dying declaration, which was the sole basis for his conviction under Section 498-A IPC.

Prosecution’s Arguments:

The prosecution maintained that:

1. Second Dying Declaration (Ext. P-26): The deceased had clearly narrated the acts of cruelty and dowry harassment, implicating the appellant and others. This declaration, being closer in time to her death, deserved substantial evidentiary weight.

2. Corroborative Evidence: Circumstantial evidence, such as the presence of kerosene traces on the deceased and the seizure of relevant articles, supported the narrative of harassment and violence.

3. Concurrent Findings: Both the trial court and the High Court had meticulously evaluated the evidence and upheld the conviction, leaving little room for interference by the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court’s Analysis:

The Supreme Court meticulously analyzed the evidentiary value of the two dying declarations and the surrounding circumstances. It reiterated the principles governing the admissibility and credibility of dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, emphasizing that:

• A dying declaration must be free from suspicion of tutoring, prompting, or fabrication.
• Consistency with other evidence on record enhances its reliability.
• Multiple dying declarations with irreconcilable inconsistencies require careful judicial scrutiny.

The Court found that the second dying declaration (Ext. P-26) was the only piece of evidence implicating the appellant in acts of cruelty. However, this declaration was discredited by the High Court, as it lacked a fitness certification from a medical professional and did not inspire confidence. Moreover, the first dying declaration (Ext. P-11), which was recorded in the presence of a doctor, did not attribute any culpability to the appellant and focused solely on the incident of the burns.

The Court further noted that the prosecution failed to produce corroborative evidence to substantiate the allegations of cruelty or dowry harassment. The circumstantial evidence, such as the smell of kerosene and the recovery of burnt articles, related only to the incident of burning and did not implicate the appellant under Section 498-A IPC.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the appellant’s conviction and sentence under Section 498-A IPC. It held that:

1. The second dying declaration (Ext. P-26), being the sole incriminating evidence against the appellant, was unreliable and could not sustain the conviction.
2. The absence of corroborative evidence and the contradictions between the two dying declarations further weakened the prosecution’s case.
3. The concurrent findings of the lower courts were flawed, as they relied heavily on discredited evidence.

The appellant was acquitted, and the Court ordered his release unless required in connection with any other case.

Significance:

 

This judgment reinforces the legal principles surrounding the admissibility and evaluation of dying declarations, particularly in cases involving multiple, inconsistent declarations. It underscores the necessity for courts to adopt a cautious and meticulous approach in scrutinizing such evidence, especially when it forms the sole basis for conviction. The successful representation by Lahoti Advocates in this case highlights their expertise in handling complex criminal appeals and their commitment to securing justice for their clients.