In Akshay Kantilal Bam & Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr., the Supreme Court of India, by order dated 27 April 2026, examined an important question concerning the framing of serious criminal charges at a belated stage, particularly where the original FIR and first statement did not contain the crucial allegation forming the basis of such charge.
Lahoti Advocates represented Respondent No. 2 / the complainant before the Supreme Court. The matter arose out of a long-standing criminal case relating to an incident dated 04.10.2007, in respect of which cross-FIRs were registered at Police Station Khajrana, District Indore. The complainant’s FIR alleged that the accused persons had come to the field, assaulted workers, set harvested soyabean on fire, and later returned with armed persons. The prosecution case was that there was an attempt to fire upon the complainant, thereby justifying addition of Section 307 IPC read with Section 149 IPC.
Procedural Background
The original chargesheet was filed in 2014 for offences under Sections 323, 294, 506, 147, 148 and 435 IPC, but not under Section 307/149 IPC. Nearly ten years after the chargesheet, the complainant filed an application before the Judicial Magistrate seeking addition of Section 307 read with Section 149 IPC and Section 120-B IPC. The Magistrate allowed the application on 24.04.2024 and committed the matter to the Court of Sessions, since Section 307 IPC is triable by the Sessions Court. Thereafter, charges were framed including under Section 307/149 IPC, and the High Court declined to interfere.
The accused approached the Supreme Court challenging the committal order and the charge under Section 307/149 IPC.
Submissions on Behalf of the Complainant
On behalf of the complainant, Mr. Lahoti submitted that the materials on record, including seizure of the gun and the crime detail form, supported the allegation that a firearm had been used during the incident. It was further argued that any variation between the FIR and subsequent statements should not be examined minutely at the stage of framing charge, since such issues are matters for trial. It was also contended that the High Court had rightly noted that actual injury is not decisive for determining whether an offence under Section 307 IPC is made out. Mr. Lahoti also argued that committal order dated 24.04.2024 has already attained finality after the dismissal of Criminal Revision and withdrawal of Petition under Section 482 CrPC before the High Court. Such dismissals were never challenged before the Supreme Court. Therefore, the committal order cannot be reopened in the subsequent proceedings wherein on Order framing Charge was challenged.
The complainant relied on the principle that at the stage of framing charge, the Court is not expected to conduct a meticulous appreciation of evidence, and that a strong suspicion may be sufficient to proceed to trial.
Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Supreme Court, however, found that the facts of the case required closer scrutiny. The Court noted that although an incident had admittedly occurred, the allegation of actual gunfire was absent in the FIR and in the complainant’s first statement recorded on 05.10.2007. The allegation that a gunshot was fired appeared only in a subsequent statement dated 16.10.2007, recorded after 12 days.
The Court also found the seizure aspect problematic. The seizure memo showed recovery of the gun at 4:40 p.m. on 04.10.2007, whereas FIR No. 581/2007 was registered later at 6:10 p.m. The Court observed that there was no explanation as to how recovery could be shown in connection with that FIR before the FIR itself was registered.
Another factor that weighed with the Court was that the statement of Rinku, who was allegedly present with the complainant and had allegedly pulled him back when the shot was fired, was not recorded by the police. According to the Court, this was a material circumstance while assessing whether Section 307 IPC could be added after such a long delay.
The Supreme Court treated this as an exceptional fact situation. It relied heavily on four features: (i) there was no allegation of gunshot in the FIR or in the first statement dated 05.10.2007; (ii)the allegation of gunfire surfaced only in a later statement recorded after 12 days; (iii) the seizure of the gun was shown at 4:40 p.m., though FIR No. 581/2007 itself was registered later at 6:10 p.m.; and (iv)the statement of Rinku, who allegedly pulled the complainant back, had not been recorded.
Magistrate’s Power at the Committal Stage
The judgment also reiterates the legal distinction between a Magistrate’s role at the committal stage and the trial court’s power at the stage of framing charge.
Relying upon Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court observed that the stage under Sections 207 to 209 CrPC is essentially a pre-trial stage, where the Magistrate performs functions of an administrative character, such as supplying documents and committing the case if it is exclusively triable by the Sessions Court. At that stage, the Magistrate is not expected to undertake a merits-based determination.
The Court also referred to State of Gujarat v. Girish Radhakrishnan Varde, where it was held that in a police-report case, addition or deletion of sections is ordinarily a matter for the competent trial court at the stage of framing charge, based on the material collected during investigation, the FIR and the chargesheet.
Final Holding
The Supreme Court concluded that the material did not warrant taking cognizance or framing charge under Section 307 IPC. It held that the committal order and the framing of charge under Section 307/149 IPC were not justified. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the orders framing and confirming the charge under Section 307/149 IPC were set aside.
Importantly, the Court directed that the Sessions Court shall remit the matter to the jurisdictional Magistrate, who may look into the evidence and allegations, frame charge afresh, and proceed in accordance with law. The Supreme Court expressly clarified that its observations are limited to the issue of framing charge under Section 307/149 IPC and shall not affect the merits of the case.
Key Takeaways
This decision is significant for three reasons.
First, it reinforces that a serious charge such as attempt to murder cannot be added mechanically, especially where the foundational allegation is absent from the FIR and first statement, and surfaces only later.
Second, it clarifies that while omissions or contradictions are normally tested at trial, a material omission relating to the very ingredient of the offence may assume importance even at the charge stage in an appropriate case.
Third, it reiterates that the Magistrate’s role at the committal stage under Sections 207 to 209 CrPC is limited, and that any addition or alteration of charges must be undertaken by the competent court with due application of mind to the material on record.